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The Incentives of Private Prisons
John F. Pfaff*
INTRODUCTION
Few institutions in our deeply flawed and troubled criminal justice system
draw as much immediate ire as private prisons. In his 2016 campaign for the
Democratic presidential nomination, for example, Senator Bernie Sanders’s
first stab at a criminal justice reform platform was to sponsor a (surely
unconstitutional) bill banning private prisons in the state and federal systems
alike. 1 The 2020 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination
similarly saw multiple candidates make pledges about private prisons, while
none gave any real attention to the specifics of publicly run institutions.2
This persistent focus on private prisons by politicians and the public alike
is misguided for at least two reasons. First, it significantly overstates the role
that privatization plays in the U.S. prison system. 3 All told, only about 8% of
prisoners in the United States are held in privately run facilities. At least
*
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Press Release, Bernie Sanders, Sen., U.S. Senate, House Leaders Introduce Bill To Ban
Private Prisons (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/sanders-house-leaders-introduce-bill-to-ban-private-prisons [https://perma.cc/4UNZ28M8]. While Congress could forbid the Federal Bureau of Prisons from signing contracts with
for-profit prison firms, the Tenth Amendment bars it from telling the states what they can do in
this situation. It’s true that Sanders’s bill was almost certainly intended to be a symbolic gesture
far more than a viable piece of legislation, but it is telling that prison privatization is what he
chose to focus on.
https://www.politico.com/20202.
The
Issues:
Private
Prisons,
POLITICO,
election/candidates-views-on-the-issues/criminal-justice-reform/private-prisons/
[https://perma.cc/6JW6-X565] (Dec. 19, 2019).
3. For the purposes of this paper, when talking about privatization, I will be referring to
privately managed prisons. There is a second sort of privatization, which receives far less attention
but may in fact be more consequential, which is the privatization of services provided in public
prisons, such as food services, medical care, and telephones. Yet it is easy to overstate the scope
of privatization here as well. See, e.g., Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Jan.
25,
2017),
of
Mass
Incarceration,
PRISON
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html [https://perma.cc/BD9C-6DXX]; John Pfaff
(@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2020, 9:19 AM) (citing THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., STATE
PRISONS AND THE DELIVERY OF HOSPITAL CARE (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2018/07/prisons-and-hospital-care_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VB56-TB89]),
https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/1231977078637178880?s=20
[https://perma.cc/D4J6EHHC]. Nonetheless, these private actors likely impact the lives of far more people in far more
significant ways.
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fifteen states do not rely on private prisons at all, and even among those states
that use private prisons, a majority have no more than 10% of their prison
populations in private facilities. 4 Mass incarceration is a public sector affair
in the United States.
The more important misperception, and the one that motivates this piece,
is that the distinctions many draw between public and private prisons are
ephemeral, if not nonexistent. The usual criticism of private prisons runs
something like this: given that private prisons make more money when more
people are held in their facilities, these firms have a strong incentive to resist
reforms, and in fact will push for tougher laws to keep their prisons full.
Implicit in this argument, though tellingly often left unsaid, is that public
prisons are somehow . . . different.
In many ways, however, they are not. To start, public prisons have a strong
incentive to keep prisons full as well. They may not profit as explicitly as
private facilities do, but as we will quickly see, those who work in prisons
and the legislators who have prisons in their districts do profit from confining
more and more people, both financially and—unlike private firms—
politically.
More critically, that private prisons focus on maximizing populations is
not inherent to privatization but results from how their contracts are written.
If states wrote different contracts—ones that did not pay per prisoner per
diem rates but instead based funding on goals such as reduced recidivism
risks—then the private prisons would focus on things other than just
warehousing people. Importantly, some places, most notably Australia and
New Zealand, but also Pennsylvania, have started to experiment with exactly
this sort of idea. 5
Once we appreciate that the issue is not “public versus private” but “what
incentives do penal institutions face,” the discussion about private prisons
can take some interesting twists and turns. It is quite possible, for example,
that it may be easier to incentivize private prisons to try to cut recidivism
than public prisons. The private prison firms’ clear focus on profit
maximization gives policymakers a direct tool that is absent with the more
nebulous goals of public prison administrators. There are some intriguing
longer-run issues that arise as well. If the goal is to substantially scale back
the scope of incarceration, it may be easier to do that in a system dominated
by private facilities. Oversimplifying somewhat, closing private prisons
4.
E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2018, at
27 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQQ4-YELR].
5.
Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Rebecca Autrey, A Critical Look at Private Prisons Overseas,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 13, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/critical-look-private-prisons-overseas [https://perma.cc/K8K2-RF28].
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simply requires the state department of corrections to decline to renew a
contract; closing public facilities can be much trickier, at least politically.
The intriguing role that private prisons might be able to play both in terms
of changing the incentives of prisons as well as scaling back the overall scope
of the prison system is uniquely relevant to Arizona, which is something of
an exception to my earlier claim that private prisons are of mostly little
import. As of 2018, almost 20% of the state’s prisoners were held in private
facilities. Only the federal government, Florida, and Texas had more people
held in private institutions, and all three of those have much bigger prison
populations (and thus much smaller percentages held in private facilities);
only Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Tennessee had larger
percentages in private prisons, but all of those have substantially smaller total
prison populations. Arizona’s outsized reliance on private institutions means
that it could stand to benefit from designing better mechanisms to run them.
And Arizona’s large prison size means that it could stand to benefit—should
the political will ever arise—from the ability to close them more quickly. 6
I have three goals here. First, I want to lay out the problems with the
conventional “public versus private” framing to illuminate the potential
malleability of private prison incentives. My second goal is then to draw
attention to what are, as far as I can tell, the only three private prisons
currently operating under incentive provisions, both to see the potential they
represent but also to acknowledge the very real challenges they have faced.
The early lessons coming out of Australia and New Zealand suggest that
writing such contracts is tricky, but in a way that should encourage us to
experiment more, not to give up on the project.
6.
CARSON, supra note 4, at 27. That is not to say that states with private prisons currently
want to cut back on incarceration. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the states that tend to rely on private
prisons tend to be more politically conservative, and thus more punitive. Except for Hawaii,
whose situation is somewhat idiosyncratic, and New Mexico, none of the states listed above with
more people or a greater fraction of people in private prisons would be seen as Democratic-leaning
states. In recent years, however, even states that were traditionally thought of as “punitive” have
sought to scale back their reliance on prisons. Oklahoma and Louisiana have both recently pushed
through impactful reforms, and even conservative politicians in Texas now boast about how many
prisons it is closing, not opening. See, e.g., James White (@James_E_White), TWITTER (June 26,
2020, 7:29 AM) (citing Jolie McCullough, As the Texas Prison Population Shrinks, the State Is
Closing Two More Lockups, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2020, 1:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/02/20/texas-closing-two-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/NTE8SPST]),
https://twitter.com/James_E_White/status/1276523021667352576?s=20
[https://perma.cc/3PQY-LTRE]. That said, I am assuming here that there is some political will to
scale back prisons or at the very least to make them function in more “productive” ways. If that
political will is simply absent—if politicians in Arizona (or elsewhere) are content to simply
warehouse people, or perhaps even view that as the morally correct response to criminal
behavior—then it is unlikely that the proposals here would be viable.
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My third goal is to examine how to think about incentive contracts in
particular, and private prisons and privatization in general, at a time when
people are pushing to dramatically scale back, if not in some way abolish,
prisons. Incentive contracts aimed at cutting recidivism raise some tricky
issues for those who wish to radically reduce punishment in the United States.
At first blush, such contracts would seem consistent with significant reforms:
less recidivism should, perhaps, translate into fewer people in prison. 7
Moreover, prison conditions would likely improve in the process, since
harsher conditions seem to lead to higher risks of recidivism. 8 By bringing
about these changes, however, such contracts could increase the political
legitimacy of prisons and thus actually impede more radical change. This is
a well-known challenge that those pushing for abolition or dramatic
reductions in prisons regularly consider: how to make conditions as humane
as possible in the short- to medium-term, but in such a way that still advances
the long-run goal of profound change. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly,
incentive contracts may actually be a viable response to this challenge.
I.

MORE SIMILAR THAN DIFFERENT

In many ways, the private prison can be traced back to the convict leasing
systems that arose in the postbellum South to effectively recreate slavery-like
conditions, if not all the way back to the first prisons, such as New York’s
Auburn Prison, which were publicly run but deeply entwined with local
business in hope that they could be financially self-sustaining. 9 For our
purposes here, however, the modern private prison was born in 1983 when
Tom Beasley, Doctor Robert Crants, and T. Don Hutto founded Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA, now called CoreCivic) and opened a private
immigration detention facility in a former hotel in Houston, Texas. 10 By the
7.
Of course, reality is a bit trickier. With almost all prison systems operating at or above
capacity, reducing admissions due to recidivism could simply mean that states become more
willing to admit people for their first conviction, or that they simply detain the people in prisons
longer, thus keeping prison populations stable as admissions fall. This latter effect, at least, has
been seen in some states. See, e.g., John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Apr. 30, 2020, 12:23
supra
note
4,
at
4–5,
13–14),
PM)
(citing
CARSON,
https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/1255940793044434944?s=20
[https://perma.cc/E77MMAR2].
8.
See, e.g., M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce
Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 16 (2007).
9.
See, e.g., SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON 19 (2018); PHILIP GOODMAN, JOSHUA PAGE
& MICHELLE PHELPS, BREAKING THE PENDULUM: THE LONG STRUGGLE OVER CRIMINAL JUSTICE
32 (2017).
10. The CCA Story: Our Company History, CORR. CORP. OF AM.,
http://www.correctionscorp.com/our-history [https://perma.cc/2ZCS-LUYX].
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early 2010s, about 130,000 to 140,000 people were held in private prisons
nationwide, making up about 8% of the total number of people serving time
behind bars. 11 As prison populations fell over the 2010s, so too did the
number in private prisons; in 2018, private facilities held about 120,000
people, which remained about 8% of the U.S. prison population. 12 Even at
their peak, then, private facilities held under 10% of people confined in U.S.
prisons.
Moreover, most of the people confined in private prisons are held in just a
handful of states. Just five jurisdictions—the federal government, and then
Texas, Florida, Arizona, and Georgia—are responsible for over half the
people detained in private prisons, and three-fourths are held in just nine
jurisdictions. Nearly twenty states do not have any private prisons at all, and
eleven states each have under 500 people held in private institutions.13
Yet despite this relatively minor impact, private prisons face intense
criticism. And I sincerely understand why. There is clearly something
particularly jarring about the idea of firms financially profiting off locking
other people up in cages, all the more so given the racial composition of those
being locked up and the legacy of slavery and racism that explains much of
it. Yet in the end, what upsets us about private prisons should upset us equally
about public ones, since public prisons ultimately profit from putting people
in cages as well—and not just financially, but politically too.
In other words, shifting away from private prisons does not shift us away
in any real sense from “profit-driven” policies. The nature of the profit might
change a bit, but as we will see, even public prisons are often sources of
monetary profiting. In fact, if we take a holistic view of “profiting,” public
prisons profit more from locking people up than private prisons, and changing
that profit motive may be harder for the public prisons.
The private profit incentive, and its deleterious implications, are easy to
see. Private prisons are paid a per diem for each prisoner they hold, 14 which
encourages them to maximize population counts. Even worse, a per diem
11. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 32 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FMS4-C8SW]; E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
PRISONERS IN 2013, at 14 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RN7H-SDQB].
12. CARSON, supra note 4, at 27–28.
13. Id. The federal government alone is responsible for nearly 25% of all people held in
private prisons. Id. If we exclude the federal government, the story remains roughly the same:
five states hold over half the people in state private prisons (the four above, plus Tennessee), and
nine states hold over 75% of such people. Id.
14. Stephanie Leacock, Private Prison Contracts and Minimum Occupancy Clauses, AM.
U. BUS. L. REV.: BLR BUZZ BLOG (Nov. 19, 2017), http://www.aublr.org/2017/11/private-prisoncontracts-minimum-occupancy-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/V7WN-9BGP].
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encourages them to cut programming and training and staffing, since the only
way to make a profit is to push costs below what the per diems bring in. And
then on top of that, the logical outcome of those cuts—harsher conditions that
in turn lead to higher rates of recidivism—actually boosts the bottom line,
since more people returning to prison keeps the beds filled, and thus the per
diem payments coming in.
On top of this, private prison firms do not feel any of the costs of
recidivism as well. The two largest private prison firms, CoreCivic and the
GEO Group, are both publicly traded; their fiduciary obligations are to their
widespread shareholders, not the communities impacted by inadequate prison
programming and staffing. The remaining firms, such as Management &
Training Corporation (MTC), are privately held, but like with CoreCivic and
the GEO Group, their owners often live far from the communities they
affect. 15 And to the extent that these private prisons are located in rural
communities but hold mostly people from urban counties, then even the staff
are socially and emotionally disconnected from many of the costs of
recidivism as well.
Now, to be clear, these skewed incentives are deeply problematic. My
argument here is not that these distorted incentives don’t actually exist, or
that they are not that bad. It is that we see the exact same ones in the public
sphere. I am not trying to elevate our view of private prisons here so much as
I want to make sure we don’t give public prisons a pass they do not deserve.
In some cases, the public prisons act like private prisons because we
literally impose the exact same incentive structures on them. In Louisiana,
for example, the state paid (public) county sheriffs per diems for each state
prisoner that the sheriffs held in their (public) county jails in an effort to
manage overcrowding in the state prison system. Unsurprisingly, the sheriffs
acted just like the private prisons described above: they fought to make sure
their jail beds were full, and instead of taking the per diem and reinvesting it
in the jail, they often skimped on services to try to use as much of it as
possible on non-jail expenses. And like the private firms, these sheriffs did
not have to worry about the harms of their bad decisions, since the people
they held were generally returned to communities in other counties, and thus

15. Dymond Green & Tala Hadavi, Why Big Banks Could Be Killing Private Prisons,
CNBC (Jan. 2, 2020, 1:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/02/why-private-prisons-geogroup-and-corecivic-are-struggling-under-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/9GC3-VKW4];
Management
&
Training
Corporation,
LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/company/mtctrainsin/ [https://perma.cc/WG5J-J7SE].
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the people who elected the sheriff were unlikely to be harmed as a result of
the sheriffs’ decisions. 16
A case as explicit as this one is rare, but it is a telling example. It lays bare
the idea that there is something fundamentally different between the public
and private sectors and makes it clear that what matters are the incentives we
give them. Give public sector officials the exact same incentives as you give
the private sector officials, and they will act just like the private sector ones.
The more significant issue is that public sector prisons operating under
conventional public sector arrangements face powerful, if better hidden,
profit incentives as well. Take, for example, the wages and benefits paid to
correctional officers and prison staff, which take up about two-thirds or more
of all prison spending: over $30 billion, maybe even closer to $40 billion, of
the ~$50 billion states spend annually on prisons. 17 To put that in perspective,
that is more than ten times what states pay private prison firms, and perhaps
one hundred times the profit those firms earn running prisons. 18 It makes
sense to think of those wages as a form of profit akin to what private prison
firms earn from their per diems, and we should expect the correctional officer
unions to fight to protect them. And the biggest threat to those wages are
layoffs in the wake of prison closures: so, like private prisons, correctional
officer unions have a strong incentive to fight to keep prisons full. It’s true
that unlike private prison revenue, officer wages do not vary with each and
every incremental change to the prison population; but the underlying
concept—prison beds must remain sufficiently full to keep state dollars
coming in—is for all intents and purposes the same.
These wages are the most direct benefit, but they in turn create other
knock-on financial gains. Prisons, at least those in rural areas, are often one
of the few (perhaps only moderately) well-paying jobs in the communities in
which they are based. The money flowing into those prisons in the form of
wages thus help support all sorts of local businesses, many of which could

16. See Cindy Chang, Louisiana Is the World’s Prison Capital, NOLA.COM (May 13, 2012,
3:00
PM),
https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_8feef59a-1196-5988-91281e8e7c9aefda.html [https://perma.cc/MXU7-9JEL].
17. CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS:
EXAMINING
STATE
SPENDING
TRENDS,
2010–2015,
at
8,
9
(2017),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/the-price-of-prisons-2015-state-spendingtrends.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYA2-SWLP]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2018 STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT:
US
SUMMARY
&
ALABAMA–MISSISSIPPI
(2018),
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2018/econ/local/public-use-datasets.html
[https://perma.cc/J9AS-HKYS].
18. Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 3.
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flounder in the absence of the prisons. 19 Legislators with prisons thus have
strong incentives to ensure their prisons remain open in order to protect the
broader economic stimulus that the prisons are providing their communities.
Another form of “profit” that public prisons generate is the so-called
“prison gerrymander,” which arises when states confront the question of
where to count people in prison as “living” for the purpose of the census,
which in turn shapes how the legislatures draw political district maps. Fortyone states count the people in prison as living in the prison, not at their most
recent address prior to incarceration; nine count them as living at their last
known addresses. 20
In the forty-one that count people as living in the prison, that decision
effectively transfers political power—via population—out of more urban,
more ethnically and racially diverse, and more Democratic areas from which
those held in prison disproportionately come and into more rural, white, and
conservative areas. Even worse, in thirty-nine of those forty-one states (the
exceptions being Maine and Vermont), people in prison count for districting
but are denied the right to vote. 21
This is—and I use this term intentionally—a five-fifths compromise, one
that inflates state-level Republican legislative power. One study of
Pennsylvania found that reversing the gerrymander would likely move
several legislative seats back to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, in ways that
would likely lead to more Democratic legislators and fewer Republican
ones. 22 Tellingly, the nine states that have reversed the gerrymander have
19. Recent work by John Major Eason casts doubt on earlier studies that suggested such
collateral economic benefits were scant. Eason’s key insight is to note that prisons are not built
in random places: the towns with prisons tend to seek them out because they are struggling to
land other businesses. Prison communities, in other words, are already disproportionately
disadvantaged. Controlling for this selection effect seems to indicate that these sorts of collateral
economic benefits are real. JOHN M. EASON, BIG HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE: RISE OF THE RURAL
GHETTO AND PRISON PROLIFERATION 14, 16 (2017).
20. The nine states that do not engage in the gerrymander are California, Delaware,
Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington. Tristiaña Hinton,
Virginia Becoming 9th State To End ‘Prison Gerrymanders,’ FULCRUM (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://thefulcrum.us/prison-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/L27N-55Q5].
21. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MC3N-VF7Q].
22. Brianna Remster & Rory Kramer, Shifting Power: The Impact of Incarceration on
Political Representation, 15 DU BOIS REV. 417, 438 (2018). Pennsylvania’s incarceration rate in
2018 was 369 per 100,000, which was just slightly below the state institution average of 392 per
100,000, so it is not a distinctly punitive state when it comes to incarceration; harsher states should
expect to see even bigger effects from the gerrymander. Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool
(CSAT)—Prisoners: Imprisonment Rates of Total Jurisdiction Population (Pennsylvania),
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done so only when the Democratic Party controlled both houses of the
legislature and the governor’s mansion; even Republican legislators without
prisons in their districts will feel pressure to block reforms that threaten their
party’s overall state-level political strength.
And unlike the $30-plus billion spent on wages, which is somewhat
insensitive to minor changes in prison populations—states rarely lay off
correctional officers absent the closure of an entire facility, and even then
they often find ways to avoid that 23—the power of the gerrymander rises
directly with the number of people confined in the facility. It is perhaps more
of a per decennium than a per diem, since it matters mostly in years that end
in a zero, but it is yet another underappreciated way in which public prisons,
and the counties and towns in which they are located, “profit” from prisons
and the number of people confined in them.
Finally, public facilities often share with private ones the same
indifference to the costs of recidivism, and thus are also fairly insensitive to
the costs of inadequate programming, health care, or, say, staff training. The
reason here is the same one that gives the prison gerrymander its power: the
people held in prisons are not returned to the communities in which the
prisons are sited (which are, roughly, the communities in which the staff live).
The costs of prison failures—higher rates of recidivism, 24 elevated risks of
drug overdose death immediately after release, 25 the spread of infectious
diseases and STDs to those communities 26—are borne . . . elsewhere. The
geographic gap is sufficient itself; the economic, cultural, urban/rural, and,
most centrally, racial divides make this indifference all the greater.

BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps [https://perma.cc/AX5S-EVP8]
(choose “Custom Tables” from the toolbar; then select “State Institutions (Total)” and
“Pennsylvania” for “Jurisdiction”; click “2018” for “Years”; “Year-End Population” under
“Population”; then “Total Jurisdiction Population” for “First Variable”; then click “Generate
Rates Table”).
23. When Michigan closed the Pugsley Correctional Facility, which employed about 230
people, it laid off only 51, all of whom had declined or refused transfers (and thus had the ability
to avoid losing their jobs). John Agar, Michigan Prison Closing Brings 51 Layoffs, MLIVE (Apr.
2,
2019),
https://www.mlive.com/news/grandrapids/2016/09/michigan_prison_closing_brings.html [https://perma.cc/RPX2-6JAC].
24. See, e.g., MARIEL ALPER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ
250975, 2018 UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD (2005–2014), at
1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf [https://perma.cc/79UFSJEE].
25. See Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Release from Prison—a High Risk of Death for Former
Inmates, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157, 161 (2007).
26. See Susan Okie, Sex, Drugs, Prisons, and HIV, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 105, 106 (2007).
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Tl;dr? 27 The similarities between public and private prisons far exceed
their differences. Public prisons, like private prisons, have strong incentives
to keep prison populations high. And public prisons, like private prisons, do
not have strong incentives to focus on programming and treatment. The two
institutions are not identical, and in some situations, the specific
differences—per diem payments, say, versus annualized wage bills—will
make a difference. But by and large, the distinctions are much more of form
than function.
An Obama-era report by the Department of Justice, for example, received
significant attention when it reported that federal private prisons had higher
rates of violence and other shortcomings. 28 Yet that is not the only study
comparing public to private outcomes—although there are fairly few studies,
a surprising result given how much attention the public–private issue has
received. Collectively, the studies fail to paint any sort of clear picture. The
results are muddy and seem to suggest, more than anything else, that there’s
little clear difference between the two types of prisons. 29 There are terribly
run public prisons and better-managed private ones, and vice versa.
Hopefully by now, this should not necessarily be surprising. If they face
roughly similar incentives, we should expect roughly similar outcomes.
Yet one key difference remains: it may be much easier to change the
incentives of private prisons than of public ones.30 What the private prisons
are most criticized for—their blind focus on the bottom fiscal line—actually
creates unique opportunities unavailable to public prisons.
This is not some sort of abstract idea: in a handful of places, governments
have started to create private prison contracts that directly incentivize these
27. Tl;dr has been in dictionaries since 2018, which seems to suggest its usage is common
enough to need no explanation. But it appears to have been used outside of a quote only once in
law reviews prior to this one, so in order to be safe, here is a good overview of its ever-evolving
etymology and usage: Andrew Heinzman, What Does “TLDR” Mean, and How Do You Use It?,
HOW-TO-GEEK (Aug. 2, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.howtogeek.com/435266/what-does-tldrmean-and-how-do-you-use-it [https://perma.cc/S3N2-B9L3].
28. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS’
MONITORING
OF
CONTRACT
PRISONS
14
(2016),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB9H-DE6L]. The report did
not examine whether the private prisons performed better or worse when it came to recidivism,
but to be fair, almost all private prisons in the federal system are used to house foreign nationals
who will almost all be deported at the end of their sentences. Id. at 25.
29. Sasha Volokh, Are Private Prisons Better or Worse than Public Prisons?, WASH. POST
(Feb.
25,
2014,
9:17
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/02/25/are-private-prisons-better-or-worse-than-public-prisons/
[https://perma.cc/8MB8-4WTZ].
30. Again: assuming the political will to do so is there. Perhaps the reason that private
prisons have functioned like public ones is because legislators had little to no actual desire to take
advantage of the opportunities that the private option presented.
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facilities to focus on reducing recidivism, rather than just warehousing people
until their terms expire. There are not many such places, and there have been
some birthing pains, but their mere existence is an important “proof of
concept” that demands our attention.
II.

A TALE OF TWO CONTRACTS
A. An Overview

Once we cut through the legalese, conventional private prison contracts
are ultimately fairly straightforward. Take, for example, the contract that the
Arizona Department of Corrections signed with the GEO Group for GEO to
manage Arizona’s Phoenix West prison. 31 The contract itself is immense—
the initial agreement is nearly 150 pages, and there are forty-one amendments
and additional contracts that follow, but the heart of the contract is easy to
summarize. On page 25, Section 9.3.1.1 simply states, “The per diem rate
shall be $61.50 per inmate, per day” (a rate that has risen to $69.57 since the
contract was first signed in 2005)—just eleven words, but ones that set the
entire problematic set of incentives in motion. This simple payment scheme
encourages firms to skimp on training and programming and eliminates any
reason for them to be concerned with recidivism rates.
Now, to be clear, there are other requirements in the contract, some of
which are surely intended to ensure a certain baseline of quality—but which
do not appear to be particularly restrictive. When staffing the prison, for
example, half the supervisory staff and one-third of the correctional officers
must have at least one—just one—year of correctional experience. 32 The
contract also requires that all staff be trained similarly to that in the public
facilities, but as Shane Bauer’s book American Prison makes clear, such
training in private institutions can often be slapdash at best and nonexistent
at worst. 33
31. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REHAB. & REENTRY, ADC CONTRACT NO. 040176DC (2012),
https://appstate.az.gov/page.aspx/en/ctr/contract_manage_public/47996
[https://perma.cc/FXD8-QWMS]. Note that the contract is initially between ADOC and
Correctional Services Corporation (CSC). The GEO Group purchased CSC in 2005, closing the
deal just a few months after this contract was signed. GEO Group Buys Out Correctional Services
LEGAL
NEWS
(Jan.
15,
2006),
Corporation,
PRISON
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2006/jan/15/geo-group-buys-out-correctional-servicescorporation/ [https://perma.cc/R6AJ-KHU6].
32. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 31, § 8.4.2, at 17.
33. See BAUER, supra note 9. To be fair, Bauer’s experience was in a single facility in
another state (Louisiana), and one that is operated by a more regional private firm, LaSalle
Corrections, than the international firms that run the facilities in Arizona.
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There are also some requirements for rehabilitative programs, but these
too are quite open-ended. The contract, for example, requires the private
facility to provide literacy programs, as required by state law, but those state
law requirements essentially boil down to two things: (1) the facility must
provide 120 days of education, and (2) the person receiving that education is
not eligible for parole if he is not reading at the required grade level. 34 (Of
course, that parole denial isn’t a sanction for the prison contractor, which
continues to profit off the person denied parole, but it does punish the person
in prison, who has absolutely no control over that education.) Moreover, there
are no immediate sanctions for failing to comply with these requirements—
nor rewards for successfully doing so—outside of the brute-force option of
terminating the contract.
Yet such terms are not unavoidable, as several private prison contracts in
the Antipodes make clear. Australia now has two prisons with contracts that
include incentive provisions—Ravenhall in Victoria and Parklea in New
South Wales—and New Zealand has one, the Auckland South (Wiri)
Corrections Facility. 35 Although the specific contract terms in all three
prisons unsurprisingly differ, they share a basic common design, which is that
they condition payment on the prison’s recidivism rate and on the extent to
which the prison (or at least the management company) provides job training,
drug treatment, and other interventions that are correlated with reduced
recidivism. We can think of these goals as “direct” and “intermediate,”
respectively.
Here, I will focus on Wiri, which opened in 2015, and Ravenhall, which
opened in 2017. 36 Both facilities are relatively new, which makes it hard to
34. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 31, § 11.10, at 53–54; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-229 to 229.02 (2020).
35. There had been three private prisons with incentive contracts in Australia, but now there
are only two. As of 2020, the Western Australia government has taken back control of the
Melaleuca Correctional Facility, which had paid private prison manager Sodexho a $15,000 bonus
per non-returning detainee. Andrew Bushnell, Institute of Public Affairs, Cutting Costs and
Reducing Reoffending (Report, September 2019) 11 (Austl.) <https://ipa.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/IPA-Cutting-costs-and-reducing-reoffending-Redesigning-privateprison-contracts-for-better-results.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/5S5Q-MU4U>. The
decision came amidst concerns that Sodexho was not properly managing the prison. Hamish
Hastie, ‘Then There Was One: WA Left with Just One Private Prison with Melaleuca To Change
Hands’,
WAtoday
(online,
23
December
2019)
(Austl.)
<https://www.watoday.com.au/politics/western-australia/then-there-was-one-wa-left-with-justone-private-prison-with-melaleuca-to-change-hands-20191223-p53mkl.html>,
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/7KD3-YXLF>.
36. ‘Ravenhall Correctional Centre’, Corrections, Prisons & Parole Victoria, (Web Page)
(Austl.) <https://www.corrections.vic.gov.au/index.php/prisons/ravenhall-correctional-centre>,
archived at <https://perma.cc/8337-QD78>; “Auckland South Corrections Facility” Department
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measure the long-run effectiveness of their contracts. Moreover, given their
newness, it is hard to determine if their initial spotty assessments reflect
fundamental problems with the concept of incentive provisions or just the
growing pains of a new project. Nonetheless, the contracts at Ravenhall and
Wiri make it clear that such approaches are feasible, and their challenges to
date will certainly help improve similar contracts in the future.
Now, as a general matter, I am wary of looking to other countries for
guidance or inspiration for repairing our criminal justice system. Not only are
institutional designs much different elsewhere, but the politics and racial
history of others’ criminal justice systems often differ significantly from
those in the United States. In this case, however, there are some important
similarities between the United States on the one hand and Australia and New
Zealand on the other. Now, there is no avoiding the fact that, on average, the
United States in general—and Arizona in particular—is far more punitive
than the other two countries. The U.S. incarceration rate is ~430 per 100,000,
and Arizona’s is ~560, while the rate in Australia is ~115, and New Zealand’s
is ~125. 37 Yet when it comes to the incarceration of racial and ethnic
minorities, Arizona, Australia, and New Zealand have much more in
common. Arizona’s incarceration rate of ~560 rises to ~1650 for Black
people; 38 in Australia, the rate of ~115 rises to ~1000 for Aborigines and

of
Corrections
(N.Z.)
<www.corrections.govt.nz/about_us/getting_in_touch/our_locations/auckland_south_correction
s_facility> [https://perma.cc/M5HK-JEZ4]. While the Parklea facility has been open for many
years, the incentive provisions are quite new, taking effect in 2019. Minister of Corrections,
Parklea Correctional Complex – Management Deed (Report, 2018) 54 (Austl.)
<https://www.correctiveservices.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Related%20Links/doingbusiness-with-csnsw/parklea-contract-documents/parklea-correctional-complex-managementdeed.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/Y3AB-7RLB>. It is thus far too early to assess how they
have worked.
37. For the United States’ and Arizona’s rates, see CARSON, supra note 4, at 9, 11. For
Australia’s prison population, see ‘Prisoners in Australia’, Australian Bureau of Statistics (Web
Page, 12 May 2019) <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/prisonersaustralia/latest-release>, archived at <https://perma.cc/HR8R-DEPM>. For New Zealand’s prison
population, see “Prison facts and statistics – March 2020” (31 March 2020) Department of
Corrections
(N.Z.)
<www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/research_and_statistics/quarterly_prison_statistics/prison_
stats_march_2020> [https://perma.cc/JM53-Q8ZB].
38. See ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REHAB. & REENTRY, CORRECTIONS AT A GLANCE: APRIL
2020 (2020), https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/REPORTS/CAG/2020/cagapr-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U66A-FXFQ], for the incarceration rate in Arizona, and QuickFacts: Arizona,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/AZ [https://perma.cc/3AY6-EQSW],
for the Black incarceration rate in Arizona.
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Torres Strait Islanders, 39 and in New Zealand the rate of ~125 quadruples to
~586 for Māori people. 40 Arizona, along with Australia and New Zealand,
also faces similar challenges when it comes to recidivism rates. About 30%
of those released from Arizona prisons return within two years, which is
actually slightly lower than the rates of 40% in New Zealand and 45% in
Australia. 41
Importantly for our purposes here, Australia and New Zealand designed
their private prison contracts to directly target both the high recidivism rates
and the racial imbalances. The contracts at both Ravenhall and Wiri introduce
several features absent from the Arizonan contract. First, both include bonus
payments if the prisons manage to cut recidivism rates for their populations
as a whole, and especially for their ethnic minority populations. The Wiri
contract, for example, awards more favorable bonuses for cutting Māori
recidivism rates than those of non-Māori, and Ravenhall’s sets a greater
reduction target for Indigenous recidivism than for non-Indigenous
recidivism. 42
39. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, supra note 37, and ‘Profile of Indigenous
Australians’, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (Web Page, 11 September 2019)
<https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/australias-welfare/profile-of-indigenous-australians>,
archived at <https://perma.cc/9X7E-T7ES>, for Australian data on incarceration rates for
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.
40. “NZ.Stat” Statistics New Zealand <http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/wbos/index.aspx>
[https://perma.cc/2VLC-7UYM] (for the first table, choose “Corrections,” then select

“Calendar Year,” click “Annual Sentenced Prisoners Populations,” then choose “Maori
under the “Ethnicity” tab; for the second table, choose “Population Estimates,” then click
“Population Estimates Tables,” then select “Estimated Resident Population, national
population by ethnic group”).
41. JOHN R. LOTT, JR. & RUJUN WANG, PRISONERS IN ARIZONA: A 2017 UPDATE ON
SELECTED TOPICS 77 fig.95 (2018), https://azsentencing.org/images/docs/Prisoners-in-Arizona--A-2017-Update-on-Selected-Topics-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GYX6-GQZM];
Marcus
Boomen “Where New Zealand stands internationally: A comparison of offence profiles and
recidivism
rates”
(2018)
6(1)
Practice
87
(N.Z.),
<https://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/33449/Practice_Journal_Vol6_Iss
1_July_2018_WEB.pdf> [https://perma.cc/EK74-X2H3] at 93; ‘Released Prisoners Returning to
Prison’,
Sentencing
Advisory
Council
(Web
Page,
2020)
(Austl.),
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/statistics/sentencing-trends/released-prisonersreturning-to-prison>, archived at < https://perma.cc/Y7QP-YSVV>. Note that because Australia
and New Zealand operate “unified” systems, with both people awaiting trial and those already
convicted held in the same facilities, the Australian and New Zealand statistics may be higher in
part because they include the people held on remand, who are not included in the Arizona data.
42. See “Agreement Relating to the PPP at Wiri Men’s Prison Project” (10 September 2012)
Department
of
Corrections
(N.Z.)
<www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/11008/Agreement_Relating_to_the_PPP
_at_Wiri_Mens_Prison_Project_-_Part_2_of_4_-_Schedules_8_-_25.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/3WG2-9XV7] at sched. 16 § 16; ‘Ravenhall Prison Project Agreement’,
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Both contracts also impose financial penalties when certain bad events
take place. The contract for Wiri, for example, imposes a fine of $600,000
per escape, “unnatural” death of a person held in the prison, riot, or hostagetaking. 43 There are an additional fifty-two “key performance indicators” that
can result in various amounts of (lesser) financial sanctions, for things
ranging from assault of a person in prison by staff and assault of a person in
prison by another such person in prison (which results in less of a sanction
than the attack by staff) to failure to properly investigate allegations of staff
misconduct. 44
Finally, the two contracts also include terms that aim at intermediate
outcomes: ones that help reduce recidivism but are not direct measures of it,
such as education, housing, drug treatment, and so on. Wiri’s contract frames
the incentive as a potential penalty (the management company is penalized if
targets aren’t met), while Ravenhall’s does so as a reward, which could have
some bearing on incentives. 45 More significantly, Wiri’s contract focuses on
what takes place while the person is held in the prison, while Ravenhall’s
extends its focus to examine what happens post-release. Wiri, for example,
assesses the fraction of people with impending release who have secured
someplace to live post-release, while Ravenhall’s contract looks into how
many maintain housing after release. 46
In many ways, these intermediate factors may be more important to focus
on than the raw recidivism rate, even though the latter may be the main metric
of interest, especially for a department of corrections. In some ways, these
intermediate factors may actually track recidivism better than our actual
recidivism data, and at least in the United States, a focus on intermediate
factors may provide a way to avoid some legal issues that could otherwise
arise. To see why, it perhaps makes sense to start with the issue of recidivism.

Department of Justice and Community Safety (Web Page, 2014) [§ 13.3] (Austl.)
<https://www.tenders.vic.gov.au/contract/view?id=58085>,
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/98WA-NHXB>.
43. See Department of Corrections, supra note 42, at sched. 16 § 1.2.
44. See sources cited supra note 42. The Ravenhall contract has similar terms, but their
specifics are redacted in the public version of the contract.
45. The psychology here is tricky, but a behavioralist insight called Prospect Theory has
made it clear that framing identical payoffs as “wins” or “losses” changes how people balance
risks. See Bushnell, supra note 35, at 17, for a discussion of Prospect Theory in the context of
private prison incentive grants (arguing for bonuses, not penalties).
46. Department of Corrections, supra note 42, §§ 4.05–4.06; Victorian Auditor-General’s
Office, Parliament of Victoria, Ravenhall Prison: Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Prisoners
(Parliamentary
Paper
No
118,
March
2020)
(Austl.)
<https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/20200319-Ravenhall-report.pdf>,
archived at <https://perma.cc/XG3G-NU8W>.
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B. A Most Misunderstood Word
“Recidivism” is a peculiar term, because it is perhaps the most important
metric for success that we have while simultaneously being one of the most
misunderstood and misused. When people talk about “recidivism,” they are
almost always thinking about reoffending—but that is not what our
“recidivism” statistics actually measure.
The core challenge is that we cannot actually observe “offending” in any
of our data. People do not regularly come forward to explain what crimes
they have committed over the past several months or years. “Recidivism”—
the statistic—measures contact with the criminal justice system. We do not
see if someone commits a crime, only if they are arrested or charged or
convicted or readmitted to prison. The relationship between measures of
these contacts and underlying offending are not as straightforward as it may
initially appear.
To start, by measuring recidivism as criminal justice contacts, we are
effectively (if implicitly) defining success as cessation, not desistance: as the
complete rejection of criminal acts, not as the gradual and imperfect process
of moving away from them. Consider two people, Bob and Mike. Prior to
prison, Bob committed one robbery per day, but after release he commits one
per week; Mike commits one per day, before and after his time in prison.
Both will eventually be rearrested for robbery, and in our “recidivism” data,
both will almost always be indistinguishable. 47 But it certainly seems like
Bob is a much bigger success story than Mike, even if an imperfect one: he
hasn’t ceased committing crimes, but he is certainly desisting from doing so.
Defining success as “no future contacts” isn’t just a blunt metric, but one
that fails to properly wrestle with how people transition away from violent
and antisocial behavior. Doing so is difficult in its own right, and it is made
all the more difficult by the host of formal and informal barriers to success
that people who have come in contact with the criminal justice system
persistently face (from informal discrimination to, say, formal bans on
employment and public housing). An incentive program that uses a crude
measure of “recidivism” will likely under-reward many successful
interventions.
Another obvious limitation with our official metrics of “recidivism” is that
they are strongly shaped by how law enforcement is deployed. It is harder,
for example, to “recidivate” in communities that have less of a police
47. Recidivism studies almost always define recidivism as “at least one” subsequent contact
(arrest, conviction, admission). See, e.g., ALPER ET AL., supra note 24, at 1. One could conceivably
adopt a more nuanced definition, but such are rarely if ever seen in official government reports
on the issue.
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presence, since crimes may be more likely to go undetected or unaddressed.
In other words, assume that both Mike and Bob reduced the number of
robberies they committed to one per week, but Mike lives in a highly policed
community and Bob in a less-patrolled one. 48 Mike is more likely to
“recidivate” because his risk of arrest is greater, even if the levels of
offending are the same (and Bob’s seeming “cessation” may be less a
reflection of his behavior and more one of his risk of detection).
The intermediate goals, however, may be able to avoid some of these
problems. There is an extensive literature pointing out how many of the
intermediate factors in the Wiri and Ravenhall contracts, like stable housing
and employment, can be important pathways toward desistance, and
eventually cessation. 49 In fact, some criminologists have recently started to
argue that we should reframe the way we think about recidivism in just this
way: less measurement of failure, more measurement of these sorts of
intermediate successes that we know often lead to (unobserved, and mostly
unobservable) desistance. 50
In other words, while Wiri and Ravenhall have received attention mostly
for their direct recidivism incentives, their provisions focusing on these
intermediate factors may actually be the more important and consequential
of their innovations.
C. Some Mixed Results
In the abstract, “incentivize better programming” is a straightforward
concept. Actual implementation, however, can be a bit harder. The early
results from both Ravenhall and Wiri, which have been mixed at best,
illuminate some important challenges such approaches face.
In both countries, for example, prison officials have struggled to determine
whether or not the prisons are actually causally reducing recidivism. One
challenge, of course, is separating effectiveness from luck. Wiri’s
management company, Serco, received a $1.1 million bonus at roughly the
same time it received sharp criticism from the Office of the Ombudsman for

48. This dynamic is why using prior criminal history in sentencing is often controversial
among reformers, who fear that a person’s history often reflects police presence in his community,
which is often shaped by the racial composition of that neighborhood.
49. See, e.g., David S. Kirk et al., The Impact of Residential Change and Housing Stability
on Recidivism: Pilot Results from the Maryland Opportunities Through Vouchers Experiment
(MOVE), 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 213, 213–26 (2018).
50. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Measuring Change: From Rates of Recidivism to Markers
of Desistance, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769, 801–06 (2019).

1008

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

failing to provide adequate services. 51 On the one hand, Wiri’s bonus came
in no small part from reducing Māori recidivism rates better than elsewhere.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s report noted that its inspectors “found
little evidence that the Prison was addressing Māori reoffending.” 52 In other
words, it certainly seems plausible that the prison’s success was due more to
luck than specific programming—which also means that there could be years
in which the prison is denied bonuses due to bad luck as well. Perhaps this is
simply an unavoidable aspect of incentives such as this, and perhaps such
errors will “net out” over time. But it does highlight the concerns of relying
simply on recidivism as the core metric, which in turn again highlights the
gains from looking at intermediate factors.
Ravenhall’s experience with its recidivism metric pointed to another, more
structural challenge. A report by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office
(VAGO) noted several limitations. To start, people held in prisons are often
moved from facility to facility, so someone “released” from Ravenhall may
have only spent the last short period of his time detained there, and someone
“released” from a state-run prison may have spent most of his time at
Ravenhall, perhaps benefiting from superior programming. 53 Assuming
Ravenhall’s programming really is superior, the first transfer issue artificially
inflates Ravenhall’s failure rate, and the second artificially inflates the state
system’s success rate; both errors lead to underestimates of Ravenhall’s
relative performance.
VAGO went on to acknowledge that the only way to practically assess
recidivism was to develop a rigorous causal model to estimate the
comparative impact of Ravenhall’s programming. Such modeling is
challenging, however. To start, it requires more data and more careful
analysis, and the VAGO report depressingly notes that Corrections Victoria
“does not currently have plans to evaluate Ravenhall’s outcomes beyond the
[current recidivism] measures,” even though “[b]etter indicators and a strong
research and evaluation project is required to meaningfully compare
Ravenhall’s performance to that of other prisons.” Moreover, even if
Corrections Victoria were willing to undertake more rigorous analyses, such
51. Andrea Vance “$1.1m bonus for private prison company Serco, for keeping people out
of jail” (20 February 2019) Stuff (N.Z.) <www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/110725103/11mbonus-for-private-prison-company-serco-for-keeping-people-out-of-jail>
[https://perma.cc/C6YF-QMK6]; Peter Boshier Report on an announced inspection of Auckland
South Corrections Facility under the Crimes of Torture Act 1989 (Office of the Ombudsman,
OPCAT
Report,
20
February
2019)
(N.Z.)
<www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/sites/default/files/2019-03/Final_OPCAT_Prison_Report__ASCF_-_PDF_online_.pdf> [https://perma.cc/W85B-848Q] at 7–8.
52. Boshier, supra note 51, at 29.
53. Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, supra note 46, at 48.
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modeling would almost inevitably lead to significant disagreement about how
they should be designed, given the sorts of methodological challenges such
models face. 54
This is not to say that assessing the intermediate outcomes was without its
challenges, but the issues that have arisen here seem more likely to be shorterrun problems that can be ironed out as the contracts progress. One issue is
that some provisions were defined too specifically and in a way that perhaps
failed to properly account for the challenges that those released from prison
realistically face. The Ravenhall contract, for example, classified someone
released from Ravenhall as successfully employed only if he secured a steady
job of twenty or more hours per week, a target that ultimately counted as
“failures” men who were working hard but simply unable to find such
employment, an all-too-common problem those released from prison face.
Especially if the goal is to emphasize gradual, imperfect desistance and
reintegration, not cessation and immediate success, intermediate metrics
should be flexible and graduated in a way that meshes with the challenges
those released will inevitably face.
Another challenge that the GEO Group and Corrections Victoria have
faced with the intermediate factors is gathering data. The recidivism data
comes from the public sector, but much of the intermediate data—such as
employment, housing, or treatment—has to come from third-party private
providers, many of whom apparently have been unwilling or uninterested in
providing the necessary data to the GEO Group. 55
Perhaps the biggest defect with the contracts that neither report addresses
is that the incentives simply are not strong enough. The bonuses in the
Ravenhall contract come to about 1% of the contract’s payments. 56 Wiri’s
$1.1 million bonus comes to what looks like about 2.5% of the payments to
Serco. 57 One study of private prison incentive contracts suggested that the
54. The VAGO report also noted that nearly 60% of Ravenhall’s sentenced prisoners spent
fewer than ninety days in prison, which rendered them ineligible for Ravenhall’s programming
and thus hard to include in the comparative metrics. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 46. In the specific case of Ravenhall, such disputes may be unlikely given how
little is relatively at stake—the incentive parts of Ravenhall’s contract come to about 1% of the
contract’s annual value. See Bushnell, supra note 35, at 14. In fact, this could be one reason why
Corrections Victoria isn’t pushing for more complex approaches. But if, as I will discuss shortly,
the incentive part becomes a bigger portion of the contract, the risk of disputes will rise
accordingly.
56. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, The Private Prison Experiments: Is There Any Positive in
(Feb.
25,
2019,
12:00
PM),
For-Profit
Imprisonment?,
SALON
https://www.salon.com/2019/02/25/the-private-prison-experiments-is-there-any-positive-in-forprofit-imprisonment/ [https://perma.cc/RCF2-LJKX]; Bushnell, supra note 35, at 11, 14.
57. The twenty-five-year contract has a value of about $1 billion, or $40 million per year.
So $1.1 million is about 2.5% of that $40 million. See Vance, supra note 51.
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contracts should be written so that the private firms cannot break even unless
they at least significantly achieve their recidivism targets. 58 Otherwise, the
incentives get skewed for both the private prison and the government. The
private prison does not have a strong incentive to achieve the targets, but the
government also does not have a strong incentive to police what the private
firm is doing or to resist its claims for bonuses. 59 Forcing the private firms to
have more skin in the reduce-recidivism game would force them to take the
issue much more seriously and would encourage the government to monitor
them much more closely.
III.

A FEW LESSONS FOR ARIZONA (AND BEYOND)

The contracts for Ravenhall and Wiri are, if nothing else, proof of concept:
while they have encountered challenges ranging from the minor to the
daunting, they show that it is possible to incentivize prisons to think more
carefully about recidivism and re-entry. Cutting recidivism and reoffending
is a huge benefit in and of itself, of course, not just to the community but to
the people leaving prisons, whose lives are better off as well. Moreover,
cutting recidivism would help scale back incarceration. In Arizona for several
decades now, about 40% of all people released from prison return within
three years, accounting for about 13% of annual admissions. 60 A greater
emphasis on recidivism will thus help Arizona and other states alleviate
overcrowding in their prisons—Arizona’s prison system, like almost all other
state systems, is operating at over 100% of its rated capacity—and will also
cut arrests and caseloads for police and prosecutors. 61 Improved contracts will
58. Bushnell, supra note 35, at 15.
59. Of course, these defects could in reality be seen as features of both the firms and the
government—both get to appear to take recidivism seriously without including terms that force
them to do so. Which is to say that pointing out that the contracts should be written in a way that
make the incentives parts important is not the same thing as saying that such contracts are easily
written as a political matter.
60. See LOTT & WANG, supra note 41, at 79 fig.96. In 2010, for example, Arizona released
about 13,500 people from prison, nearly 40% of whom returned to prison within three years. Over
those three years, Arizona admitted about 40,000 total people to prison; the 40% returning from
the 2010 release group made up about 13% of those 40,000 admissions. See id. See generally
Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT)—Prisoners: Number of Sentenced Prisoners
Admitted to State or Federal Prisons, 1978–2018, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps [https://perma.cc/7JJV-5PSB] (choose “Quick Tables”;
then select “Number of Sentenced Prisoners Admitted to State or Federal Prisons, 1978-2018”
under “Prison Admissions”).
61. See CARSON, supra note 4, at 25–26 tbl.17. Arizona’s own most recent data from May
2020 has its capacity usage at over 105% of its rated capacity. See ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REHAB.
&
REENTRY,
CORRECTIONS
AT
A
GLANCE:
MAY
2020
(2020),
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thus cut harms and save city, county, and (ideally) state governments money
that can be reinvested into more socially productive efforts.
There are a few lessons that states like Arizona can take away from the
contracts already in the field. Perhaps the most important one is that the
intermediate factors may be the ones that deserve the most attention, for both
empirical and legal reasons. Empirically, as noted above, determining
whether someone in fact recidivated is difficult, since people have an
incentive to avoid self-reporting criminal acts. It may be easier to assess if
they are in school, or have stable housing, or are attending drug or mental
health treatment. Now, to be clear, Ravenhall has struggled even here, with
some third-party providers of those services either failing or refusing to share
data. But it still seems easier to verify these pro-social outcomes than
reoffending. Moreover, there could be data problems with the more general
recidivism provisions. It is quite possible that state departments of
corrections, fearing how they might compare to better-incentivized private
providers, may balk at providing the necessary data to draw comparisons.
Finally, these intermediate factors are successes in and of themselves. Far
too often we view “recidivism” as the alpha and omega of prison success.
Someone who ultimately returns to prison but before doing so has a more
fulfilling life—rewarding employment, housing that allows him to feel
secure, the chance to build better and stronger connections with family and
friends—has certainly “succeeded” more than someone who returns to prison
after experiencing fewer (or none!) of those things. Yes, all those things and
not reoffending is better still, but the outcomes measured by the intermediate
factors have worth, in both moral and consequentialist ways.
Also, at least stateside, the intermediate factors may be able to accomplish
goals that the direct recidivism factors cannot. The approaches used in
Australia and New Zealand to confront racial bias—rewarding contractors
more for cutting the recidivism rates of ethnic and racial minorities—would
likely not pass constitutional muster over here. If states determined that
certain intermediate goals would benefit different groups differently,
however, they could conceivably reward certain factors more than others, in
a way that could target racial disparities in prison while being sufficiently
race-blind to avoid strict scrutiny.
One obvious concern with emphasizing intermediate goals is that the
contract almost starts to look like a private parole contract than a private
prison one: a contract like Ravenhall’s that focuses on post-release outcomes
in effect encourages the prison manager to also provide and maintain posthttps://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/REPORTS/CAG/cagmay-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KHW-KVTH].
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release services. 62 Such an idea is certainly not without controversy. While
private parole is not something that really exists, private probation is, and it
is quite often subjected to harsh criticisms. 63 Note, though, that the criticisms
of private probation, like those of private prisons, blame the institution for
the contract terms. Private probation as practiced in the United States is quite
flawed because current private probation systems are basically designed to
make those on probation pay for their probation, and the private companies
make more money the longer someone is on probation. 64 These are terrible
incentives. Ideally, an intermediate-focused prison contract would, in effect,
be a private parole system that pays based on people getting off parole.
A related benefit of focusing on post-release intermediate factors is that it
addresses the perhaps surprising fact about the time served in Arizona’s
prisons. Like with Ravenhall, many of the people incarcerated in Arizona
(and elsewhere) are held in prison for only a short period of time and thus
may not qualify for certain programming options, or even if they do, may not
be there long enough to take much advantage of them. About one-third of all
people held in Arizona prisons are released within six months, and between
40% to 50% in just one year. 65 The share of such short-serving detainees will
likely be even larger in the state’s private prisons, which are mostly
minimum-security facilities. 66 Post-release incentives are all the more
important in this context.
Moreover, a state like Arizona that relies heavily on private prisons may
be able to avoid or mitigate at least one of the major problems that Ravenhall
62. In fact, one reason the GEO Group received the contract for Ravenhall was that it already
had relationships with reentry services through its Bridge Centre, which has provided extended
assistance to men released from Ravenhall. See Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, supra note
46, at 41 (discussing the “unique features” of Ravenhall, including the Bridge Centre).
63. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Opinion, Georgia’s Privatized Probation and Parole System
POST
(Oct.
5,
2018,
11:23
AM),
Isn’t
Working,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/10/05/georgias-privatized-probationand-parole-system-isnt-working/ [https://perma.cc/8PEX-WQTF].
64. “Set Up To Fail”: The Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation on the Poor, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/set-fail/impact-offenderfunded-private-probation-poor [https://perma.cc/L2Q7-BBHC].
65. See LOTT & WANG, supra note 41, at 23 figs.19–20.
66. The GEO Group’s 3,500-bed Kingman facility is minimum-medium-security, and its
1,300-bed Central Arizona facility is also medium-security but (currently) intended for those
convicted of sex offenses. See Kingman, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REHAB. & REENTRY,
https://corrections.az.gov/location/110/kingman
[https://perma.cc/8FWY-AQ7Q];
Central
Arizona Correctional Facility (CACF), ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REHAB. & REENTRY,
https://corrections.az.gov/location/111/central-arizona-correctional-facility-cacf
[https://perma.cc/94GH-QC2Z]. All remaining facilities, either run by the GEO Group or other
firms, are minimum-security. See, e.g., Marana, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REHAB. & REENTRY,
https://corrections.az.gov/location/108/marana [https://perma.cc/KR3D-QU6D].
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and Wiri faced, which was the confusion created by transferring people from
one prison to another. For example, the GEO Group manages four of the six
private facilities in Arizona, accounting for about 5,800 of the state’s nearly
8,000 privately run beds. 67 Rather than writing contracts that focus on specific
prisons, the state could incentivize the companies, by trying—with some
(non-trivial) adjustments—to keep transfers within the network of GEO
Group facilities. 68
Even if transfers within a private prison firm’s set of prisons are
impractical, the state could design contracts that reward all three private
prison companies operating in the state bonuses based on the collective
performance of the private prisons, perhaps prorated based on the amount of
time someone spent in each firm’s facilities. Outside of the GEO Group’s
four private prisons, there is also a small minimum-security prison focused
on people with substance use disorders run by the Management and Training
Corporation, and a larger general-population minimum-security prison
managed by CoreCivic. 69 Building incentives around all six facilities
simultaneously could open up more options, even if it forecloses the ability
to pit the private prisons against each other to encourage innovation in
treatment—and humaneness.
Finally, one lesson from both Ravenhall and Wiri that states like Arizona
should note is that the contracts will work best if they ensure that firms have
real skin in the game. The incentive provisions at both Ravenhall and Wiri
were only minor fractions of the total payments those firms would receive,
which significantly mutes the need to focus on them. To ensure that the firms
67. See THE GEO GRP., INC., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 118 (2018),
https://www.snl.com/interactive/newlookandfeel/4144107/GEOGroup2018AR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3CC-E2K7]; see also E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., PRISONERS IN 2016, at 22 tbl.17 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YS5D-BYF6].
68. The adjustments may be somewhat significant. One of the GEO Group’s facilities, the
minimum-medium-security facility at Kingman, is a general-population institution. See Kingman,
supra note 66. The remaining three are smaller, more specialized prisons (Central Arizona focuses
on sex offenses, Phoenix West on people with substance use disorders, and Florence West on
people with DUIs and other nonviolent offenses). See Central Arizona Correctional Facility
(CACF), supra note 66; Phoenix West, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REHAB. & REENTRY,
https://corrections.az.gov/location/107/phoenix-west [https://perma.cc/H9US-CC4M]; Florence
DEP’T
OF
CORR.,
REHAB.
&
REENTRY,
West,
ARIZ.
https://corrections.az.gov/location/109/florence-west [https://perma.cc/L75Z-PPJ8]. If all four
were general-population facilities, the idea of keeping transfers within the GEO Group’s network
would be straightforward, at least in theory. Such a proposal at this point may thus require
reconfiguring how some facilities are used or the mix of people held in them.
69. See Marana, supra note 66; Red Rock Correctional Center, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR.,
REHAB. & REENTRY, https://corrections.az.gov/location/112/red-rock-correctional-center
[https://perma.cc/DZ46-ACA2].
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truly emphasize cutting recidivism and advancing the intermediate goals, the
contracts should be written such that the firms will lose money on the
contracts unless the goals are substantially met.
Obviously, a pivot toward incentive contracts would require Arizona to
effectively tear up all the old contracts and start anew with incentive-based
ones. But this is not without precedent—Pennsylvania did this with its
halfway house contracts in 2013, and the program appears to be working. 70
And doing so has the potential to make prisons more humane places while
also potentially cutting back on the scale of incarceration in states that use
private prisons.
IV.

INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND ABOLITION

As I write this in the summer of 2020, the politics of criminal justice
appears to be in the midst of a significant realignment, with abolitionist goals
receiving significantly more attention than they had even just a few months
ago. Anyone seriously thinking about police and prison reform has had to
wrestle with the implications of abolitionism for a while now, but the protests
prompted by the murder of George Floyd by police officer Derek Chauvin
have pushed the issue to the forefront of our national debate about what the
goals of criminal justice reform should be, and about whether incremental
reforms work . . . or if they might even be harmful. It is a question that is
essential to raise here as well: if one is committed to dramatically scaling
back the scope of incarceration in the United States, are incentive contracts
helpful or harmful? To my own surprise, I found myself thinking that a shift
toward private prisons with incentive contracts may actually be consistent
with long-run abolitionist goals. The argument here is still tentative and
conditional, but I also think intriguing.
This is not the place to provide a lengthy discussion of what “abolition”
refers to, in part because like any broad concept, the term itself is often
contested. But, oversimplifying (perhaps significantly), the basic idea is that
instead of investing in police and prosecutors and prisons, we should invest
in the sorts of institutions, like schools and jobs, that help communities selfregulate. 71 And to the extent that there should be enforcement, it should be
managed by local community organizations, not the formal criminal justice
70. See Leonard Gilroy, Pay for Success Contracting Reducing Recidivism in Pennsylvania,
REASON FOUND. (Aug. 31, 2015), https://reason.org/commentary/pennsylvania-contractrecidivism/ [https://perma.cc/RU2H-PZTV].
71. See Aaron Ross Coleman, Police Reform, Defunding, and Abolition, Explained, VOX
(July 16, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/21312191/police-reform-defunding-abolitionblack-lives-matter-protests [https://perma.cc/LEE3-8LHS].
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system, given the fraught history with that system that poor communities of
color, Black communities in particular, have had. 72 When it comes to prisons,
the goal is to replace prisons entirely as institutions: to invest in alternate
methods of achieving public safety and accountability. 73
The underlying intuition here is not as extreme as it might seem at first to
those unfamiliar with it. Most communities that experience low crime do not
do so because of the constant looming threat of arrest or punishment; if
anything, safe neighborhoods are defined by the absence of police and formal
state punishments, at least within their borders. These communities have the
resources and capacity to regulate themselves, with some but minimal state
involvement. The goal of abolition is to explore how to achieve these
outcomes everywhere.
Over the years, I have become increasingly sympathetic to the abolitionist
goals when it comes to prisons. The data increasingly shows, fairly
unambiguously, that prison is a highly ineffective, blunt-force tool for dealing
with crime: while it incapacitates, it also causally increases the risk of
reoffending upon release, and its deterrent impact is often significantly
overstated. 74 Moreover, the (unmeasured) social costs—the years of life lost,
the families disrupted, diseases spread, drug overdoses caused, and on and
on—are surely staggering. 75 And there is a growing menu of options that can
replace the prison, in ways that not only promote public safety, but better
address the needs of those harmed and those who cause harm alike. 76
Abolition, of course, is clearly a long-run goal, and that actually raises
some tricky policy issues when it comes to reform efforts. It is not always
clear that short-run reforms translate into long-run radical change. In fact, the
more effective the reform, perhaps the more risks it poses to fundamental
realignment. Consider the case of, say, incentive contracts for private prisons.
If incentive contracts actually work, and prisons operating under them
perform better, then such contracts may actually increase the political
72. See,
e.g.,
Community
Accountability,
TRANSFORMHARM.ORG,
https://transformharm.org/community-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/2EA4-6A7H].
73. See, e.g., Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change
Your Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prisonabolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html [https://perma.cc/2URK-W9WC].
74. See DAVID ROODMAN, OPEN PHILANTHROPY PROJECT, THE IMPACTS OF INCARCERATION
ON
CRIME
7–8
(2017),
https://www.openphilanthropy.org/files/Focus_Areas/Criminal_Justice_Reform/The_impacts_o
f_incarceration_on_crime_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TDG-JC7V].
75. See John Pfaff, The Incalculable Costs of Mass Incarceration, APPEAL (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://theappeal.org/the-incalculable-costs-of-mass-incarceration/
[https://perma.cc/UQ3JLLR5].
76. See, e.g., DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND
A ROAD TO REPAIR (2019).
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legitimacy of prisons and thus make future, more transformative change
harder. 77 The flip side, of course, is that if those contracts work, then prison
will be a less oppressive place for those inside it and fewer people will return
to it, both huge improvements for those who experience them. 78
Thus, abolitionists argue that it is important to focus on short-run reforms
that also advance, or at least do not hinder, longer-run transformative
change. 79 Perhaps surprisingly—I surprised myself in reaching this
conclusion—it seems that private prisons with incentive contracts could
satisfy both these goals: improving short-run conditions while not impeding,
and perhaps in a way even facilitating, future long-run change. I don’t mean
for this to sound contentiously contrarian, but the argument at least merits
thinking through.
To see why private prison incentive contracts may be consistent with longrun abolitionist goals, it is essential to think about two aspects of the
economics and politics of public prisons discussed above. To start, public
prisons are often important sources of employment and political power in
poorer, more rural parts of the country. 80 And unlike in private prisons, the
workforces in public prisons are unionized, and these public sector unions
often wield significant political power of their own. 81
It is easy to see why these two factors mean that public prisons will
aggressively resist any sort of significant reform, and in fact will do so far
more aggressively than private prison firms. First, private prison firms are
much better able to adapt to fundamental changes than public sector
corrections officers and the legislators with prisons in their districts. The push
for decarceration has often emphasized that funding should be moved into
77. Of course, for those who are non-abolitionist reformers—who accept the legitimacy of
prisons as an institution but want to make them better—the contracts would have accomplished
exactly what they were intended to do. “Prison reform” is often spoken of as if it is, for all intents
and purposes, a fairly monolithic movement, but like any broad social movement, it contains
factions that often disagree in quite fundamental ways.
78. See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen, How To Create More Humane Private Prisons,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/how-create-more-humane-private-prisons [https://perma.cc/M3UH-MH97].
79. See, e.g., CRITICAL RESISTANCE, REFORMIST REFORMS VS. ABOLITIONIST STEPS IN
POLICING,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59ead8f9692ebee25b72f17f/t/5b65cd58758d46d34254f22
c/1533398363539/CR_NoCops_reform_vs_abolition_CRside.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RY7FP98L].
80. See generally Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
81. See SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41177, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
PRISON GROWTH 14 (2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41177.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN2FW6SK].
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areas such as drug treatment and other social services 82—services that will be
mostly provided closer to where those who need them live. In other words,
they will transfer resources from more rural prisons to more urban treatment
facilities. To correctional officers and the legislators who rely on prisons for
economic and political benefits, this is a direct and significant loss, one that
they will resist aggressively. The officers are not trained to work in such
centers, nor can they simply relocate halfway across the state for such a job;
the politicians are similarly incapable of easily adapting.
But it’s not the same for the private prison firms, which can easily adapt,
and in fact are already doing so. While the correctional officer cannot simply
move from, say, Kingman to Phoenix, the GEO Group could easily shut down
its Kingman facility and open up a Phoenix-based treatment center. Tellingly,
firms such as CoreCivic and the GEO Group are already doing this. 83 Of
course, this means that these firms are now involved in programs such as drug
treatment, but unlike prisons, many social services are already highly
privatized. Nearly 90% of all drug treatment facilities, for example, are run
by for- or non-profits (with non-profits making up an overall majority of such
facilities). 84 Obviously, the proposal here would aggravate any concerns
people have with privatization in the treatment or other social services sector,
but given the extensiveness of privatization in these areas already, the
marginal impact would likely be slight at most.
Moreover, the workforces in private prisons tend not to be unionized, 85
which means they are less able to coordinate their opposition to closures.
Such non-unionized correctional officers also seem likely to have weaker ties
with other law enforcement unions and lobbying groups, such as police
unions and state-level district attorney associations, who could advocate on
their behalf as well. As a result, closing private prisons seems far easier to
accomplish than closing public ones. The private firms will be far more
willing than local politicians to accept a shift from more rural prisons to more
urban treatment facilities, and the private prison workforce is less able to
82. See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Commentary, Decarceration of U.S. Jails
and Prisons: Where Will Persons with Serious Mental Illness Go?, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 489, 491 (2014).
83. See generally KARA GOTSCH & VINAY BASTI, THE SENT’G PROJECT, CAPITALIZING ON
MASS
INCARCERATION:
U.S.
GROWTH
IN
PRIVATE
PRISONS
1
(2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Capitalizing-on-MassIncarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY3V-C4DW].
84. Eighty-nine percent of all facilities are privately run, and 51% (of the total, not just the
non-government facilities) are run by non-profit private firms. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (NSSATS)
13
(2018),
https://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/dasis2/nssats/n2018_st_profiles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D7A2-J98K].
85. See GOTSCH & BASTI, supra note 83, at 6.
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resist such a move. 86 Thus, it is not implausible that adopting incentive
contracts—which seem easier to impose on private prisons than on public
ones—could simultaneously improve conditions in the short run while at least
not impeding (and perhaps even facilitating) longer-run change.
In other words, yes, it is true that incentive contracts may make prisons
“better” (not good, but better), and in doing so, risk increasing their political
legitimacy. But there are valid reasons to think that this sort of entrenchment
risk is less when we are dealing with private prisons. While I’ve often argued
that public and private prisons are more similar than different, here there is a
key difference: public prisons are geographically fixed, while private prison
firms are not. Thus, public prisons cannot change their mission as easily as
private firms can. In this case, these distinctions—immaterial when
considered within the world of prisons, but quite relevant when thinking
about moving away from it—suggest that private prison firms will resist
transitions away from imprisonment far less than public prisons. Thus,
incentive contracts may allow us to improve short-run conditions in prisons
in a way that, perhaps surprisingly, at least does not hinder pushes for more
transformative change.
In fact, incentive contracts could be uniquely effective in conservative and
fairly punitive states like Arizona. If they work, they demonstrate that more
humane approaches are consistent with public safety—but do so by taking
advantage of capitalistic incentives, which may be more politically palatable
to a more conservative electorate. This could open up political options that
had earlier been closed off.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, public and private prisons alike were effectively paid per
diem rates for the people they confined. The form of such payments may have
differed, but in substance, the incentives were relatively identical. Recent
experiments in Australia and New Zealand suggest that we can, in fact, write
contracts that encourage private prisons, at least, to focus more on cutting
recidivism. Such contracts remain in the infancy right now, but a state like
86. It should be noted that the economic implications of any prison closure, public or
private, deserve our attention, even though that is a too-far tangent for this paper. Prison closures
will come with real economic costs that will hurt real people. That is not an argument for keeping
prisons open—there are better ways to support economically vulnerable rural communities than
putting people in cages—but we should still think about how to assist those communities that will
be hurt by closures. See, e.g., John Pfaff, Cory Booker Has a Plan To “Reverse” Mass
Incarceration. It Won’t Work., VOX (Sept. 26, 2017, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2017/9/26/16363230/mass-incarceration-cory-booker-reverse-bill [https://perma.cc/QE89DXYQ].
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Arizona, which relies on private prisons more heavily than perhaps any other
state in the country, seems like the ideal laboratory for working through how
to use such contracts far more extensively.

